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Abstract. We estimate an econometric model of coca production in Colombia.  Our 
results indicate that coca eradication is an ineffective means of supply control as 
farmers compensate by cultivating the crop more extensively. The evidence further 
suggests that incentives to produce legal substitute crops may have greater supply-
reducing potential than eradication. 
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Introduction 
Coca (Erythroxylum coca)  is the main input in the manufacture of cocaine 
hydrochloride, an addictive, pscyhostimulant drug whose use is illegal today in most 
countries.  Policies regarding production and use of coca and its derivatives are 
controversial.  The controversy focuses primarily on whether drug-control policies are 
effective in achieving their stated objectives of reducing cocaine usage.  
 
The Policy Setting 
 
Cocaine is produced in four stages: cultivation of the coca plant and harvesting of 
the leaf, extraction of coca paste, transformation of the paste into cocaine base, and 
conversion of the base into cocaine (Riley, 1993).  In the past, small-holding producers 
who grew coca sold the dried leaf after harvest.  In recent years, some smallholders 
have begun to produce coca paste in an effort to generate additional value added. 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are host to more than 98% of the global land area 
planted in coca.  In 2000, over 210,000 hectares of coca were cultivated in these three 
countries (UNDCP 2000).  The coca production share of these three countries shifted 
dramatically over the period 1986-2000.  During this period, the Colombian share 
increased from 12% to 75%, while the shares of the other two countries decreased from 
75% to 18% for Peru and from 13% to 8% for Bolivia (UNDCP 1999, 2000). Global 
supply during the same period has remained almost constant with estimates of the 
growth ranging from -7.7% to 5.8% (UNDCP 1999, 2000). 
  By 2001, an estimated 163,000 hectares were planted in coca in Colombia, 
primarily in three departments, the largest political division in the country's system of   3
governance (CGR, 2001).  Putumayo, Guaviare, and Caqueta departments produce 
approximately 68% of Colombian coca leaf (DNE 2000).  These isolated regions of the 
country have long received relatively little funding from the Colombian national 
government for infrastructure, technical assistance, education, and health services – 
limiting the range of feasible legal economic activities.  In 1998, the index of poverty, 
measured in terms of unsatisfied basic needs (housing, health services, education, and 
infrastructure) for rural areas was estimated at 72% in Caqueta and 100% in Putumayo 
and Guaviare (DNP, 2002).  
  During the past decade, governments in the coca-producing countries and 
governments in cocaine-consuming countries have waged a “war on drugs,” allocating 
monies to control production and distribution through coca eradication, crop substitution, 
and interdiction (interception) of cocaine supply.  In Colombia, the eradication of illegal 
crops has intensified in the last 10 years.  From 459 hectares in 1991, the area 
eradicated annually in Colombia increased to 72,379 hectares in 2001 (DNE 2000, 
UNDCP 2000, CGR, 2001).  Approximately US$113 million was spent on aerial 
spraying of coca in Colombia from 1994 to 2000.  In 2000, the United States 
government approved a two-year budget of US$ 860 million in support of the national 
government’s Plan Colombia, whose main objective is to reduce drug production and 
trafficking.  Of the US$860 million allocated to Colombia, US$ 642 million was 
designated specifically for efforts to reduce the supply of illegal crops.  As a 
complement, US$ 440 million were approved for related activities in surrounding 
countries.     4
A number of reasons have been advanced for why coca acreage has increased 
in Colombia despite the intensification of counter-narcotic policies. Cocaine traffickers 
appear willing to increase the farm gate price to compensate farmers for policy-induced 
increases in production risk.  They are able to do this because, though coca is the 
primary ingredient in the production of cocaine, the farm gate price is a small fraction of 
the retail price of cocaine in the consuming countries.  Doubling or tripling the farm gate 
price can occur with a barely perceptible influence on the retail price in North America 
and Europe.  Other reasons for the increase in coca supply in Colombia despite supply-
control policies complement this hypothesis: low national and international prices for 
agricultural products, rising poverty rates in rural areas of Colombia, the virtual 
abandonment of some regions by the national government, inequality in land 
distribution, and the presence of left-wing guerillas and right-wing paramilitaries.  
Guerrilla and paramilitary groups, which profit from the drug trade, control the main 
coca-producing regions, and civil unrest has undoubtedly contributed to the expansion 
of coca acreage in Colombia (UNDCPa 2000). 
  Contrary to the widespread belief that the Colombian economy depends largely 
on the illegal drug trade, Steiner (1998) showed that drug revenues represent a small 
percentage of national income.  Using official data and his own computations, Steiner 
(1998) found that income from the drug trade represents approximately 3 percent of 
Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 25 percent of its exports. 
   5
Previous Research 
There is a small body of economic research examining the market for illegal 
drugs.  Demand studies have focused on factors affecting the consumption of illegal 
drugs by various population groups, the impact of consumption on worker performance, 
the effect of illegal drug use on labor market outcomes, substitution or complementarity 
among various illegal drugs, consumer expenditures on illegal drugs, the effect of drug-
control spending on illegal drug use, and the effects of decriminalization of illegal-drug 
possession on prices and consumption (Saffer and Chaloupka 1998, MacDonald and 
Pudney 2000, Desimone 1998, Grossman and Chaloupka 1998, and Chaloupka, 
Grossman and Tauras, 1998).   
Most of the supply studies of illegal drugs focus on the effectiveness of drug 
control policies. Fowler (1990) analyzed the effects of drug interdiction expenditures on 
illegal drug use. Gibson and Godoy (1993) analyzed alternatives to coca production in 
Bolivia using a computable general equilibrium model of the national economy. Riley 
(1993) assessed the impact of eradication, interdiction, and economic development 
strategies in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru using a dynamic economic model of the 
cocaine industry and source- country drug-control policies. They concluded that these 
policies could disrupt production for only short periods.  Whynes (1991) used a simple 
game-theoretic approach to examine the feasibility of various supply-side policy options 
including taxation of coca production, crop substitution, eradication, and purchase of 
production by the government. He concluded that supply policies are ineffective as a 
means of drug control.   6
Kennedy, Reuter and Riley (1993), using a model of cocaine production in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, analyzed the determinants of the volume of cocaine trade, 
and simulated the effects of crop substitution, eradication, and other policies on cocaine 
production. One of the main conclusions was that strategies that seize and destroy even 
as much as 70% of cocaine production will have little impact on the market if cocaine 
traffickers can increase gross production to compensate for some percentage of the 
product being destroyed. The reason is that the increased cost of the higher gross 
production is low relative to the retail price of cocaine. They also conclude that crop 
substitution has a negligible impact on the world cocaine market because traffickers can 
easily exceed any economic profit coming from proposed substitution programs. 
Rydell and Everingham (1994) examined the cost-effectiveness of both supply 
and demand control programs including source-country control, interdiction, domestic 
enforcement, and treatment of heavy users. They concluded that cutting back on supply 
control and expanding treatment of heavy users would make cocaine control policy 
more cost-effective. 
Other studies have sought to identify specific economic, political, and social 
conditions that contribute to the emergence of illegal drug production. Morrison (1997) 
found that contributing factors include isolation, economic insecurity in rural areas, and 
lack of enforcement caused by corruption or insurgency.  It is clear that these conditions 
are prevalent in Colombian coca-producing regions. 
  Focusing on Colombia, Uribe (2002) estimated the profitability of coca production 
for peasants in the three largest coca-producing departments. He found that the net 
income of peasant producers of coca ranged from US$1,629 to US$ 3,895 per year   7
when the cost of family labor is not counted.  If family labor is valued at local wage 
rates, net income is lower and can even be negative depending on the region, ranging 
from –US$1,485.91 to US$ 1,792.06. 
  Based on the existing literature, there is little reason to believe that supply control 
measures have been effective in reducing the production or trafficking of illegal drugs.  
No single drug policy instrument appears capable of permanently reducing output due 
to inherent characteristics of the cocaine industry: the availability of low-cost land and 
labor in politically unstable regions, and the ease of transporting the low-bulk and low-
weight final product.   
 
Analysis of Coca Cultivation 
Most previous studies on the effectiveness of drug supply-control policies have 
used non-stochastic methods, such as market simulation models.  Deterministic 
methods have been used in these studies primarily because the relatively small number 
of observations available on drug crop production limits the degrees of freedom 
available for econometric analysis.  Crop estimates are available on only an annual 
basis.  The number of observations increases, however, with each passing year.  In this 
study, we utilize annual United Nations data on cocoa cultivation in Colombia over a 14-
year period to estimate an econometric model of Colombian coca cultivation.  We 
confront the problem inherent in small-sample econometric analysis by utilizing 
influence diagnostics (Belsley, Kuh, and Welch 1980) to determine the extent to which 
parameter estimates from our model are influenced by individual observations in the 
dataset.   8
Data.   Due to the illegality of coca, available data on this crop are scarce. 
Although in recent years more sources of information have become available, not all of 
them are reliable. The lack of quantity and quality in data is a difficult problem to solve 
because “the boom” of coca production and its subsequent control in Andean countries 
started in the 1980s and neither national nor international institutions collected data 
before that period. When production of coca and consumption of cocaine reached 
alarming levels, national and international organizations began drug control programs 
and started to  monitor the cultivated area and the volume of output in producer 
countries.  
The data used in this study come from four sources: data on coca (area 
cultivated, area eradicated, and prices) were obtained from published reports of United 
Nations Office for D rug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) and from the 
Colombian narcotics-control agency (Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes).  UNDCP 
reports are based on annual questionnaires completed by government agencies in the 
producer countries.  Plantain price data were obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture of 
Colombia and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
The Basic Model.  The decision to plant coca is assumed to be influenced by 
prices and alternative production opportunities in a manner similar to decisions 
regarding other farming activities.  The area planted in coca is also assumed to respond 
to coca eradication policies in Colombia and to the area planted in other major coca-
producing countries.  Since coca is a perennial crop and the gestation period spans 
more than one growing season, we assume that the area planted responds to 
production conditions in the previous year.     9
Based on these assumptions, we specify the following econometric model of 
coca cultivation: 
      O     E     PP     P         H 1 - t 4 1 - t 3 1 - t 2 1 - t 1 0 t t e b b b b b + + + + + =        
where H is the number of hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia, P is the farm-
gate price of coca, PP is the farm-gate price of plantain, E is the number of hectares of 
coca eradicated in Colombia, and O is the number of hectares of coca under cultivation 
in Bolivia and Peru.  The error term is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and constant variance; that is, e ~ N(0,s
2).  The subscript t refers to the current 
year while t-1 refers to the previous year.  The model was estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). 
It is assumed that coca farmers attempt to maximize profits, subject to various 
constraints.  Therefore, own price of coca is hypothesized to have a positive effect on 
area planted in coca, while the price of plantain, a crop substitute, is expected to be 
negatively related to the number of hectares planted in coca.  Coca eradication policy 
increases the production risk faced by farmers.  Given the limited alternative economic 
opportunities in Colombia’s coca-growing regions, it is expected that farmers respond to 
this increased risk by planting additional hectares of coca.  Therefore, we hypothesize a 
positive relationship between cultivated area and eradicated area.   Finally, the area 
planted in coca in other producing countries is hypothesized to be inversely related to 
the area cultivated in Colombia, as traffickers are assumed to quickly seek out new 
geographic sources of supply when production is reduced in old production areas. 
Model 1.  As shown in Table 1, all variables in the coca cultivation model are 
significant at the five-percent level, and the model explains a high proportion of the total   10
variation in Colombian coca cultivation (adjusted R
2 = 0.992).  All parameters have the 
expected signs.  Consistent with our hypotheses, eradication appears to increase rather 
than reduce hectares planted in coca, and cutbacks in coca production in Bolivia and 
Peru result in the planting of more hectares of coca in Colombia.   
The estimated parameters were used to compute elasticities at mean values of 
the variables.  Coca cultivation is inelastic to own price (h = 0.181), as shown in Table 
4.  Low area-planted responsiveness to price could be due to the fact that coca is a 
perennial crop.  Once it is planted, the coca bush continues to produce foliage each 
year with a minimum of maintenance, thus muting the responsiveness of production to 
price.  The control that guerilla groups and paramilitaries exert over production and 
marketing decisions in coca-producing areas in Colombia probably further diminishes 
the effect of the farm gate price on coca cultivation. 
  The elasticity of coca cultivation with respect to hectares eradicated in Colombia 
indicates that producers increase the area cultivated in response to eradication efforts 
but less than proportionately (m = 0.209).  Since coca is generally somewhat more 
profitable than other crops, producers apparently respond to the production risk 
imposed through supply control policies by increasing the area planted.  Eradication 
seems to have an effect opposite to the one intended by policymakers. 
The cross-price elasticity (j = -0.380) indicates that coca cultivation decreases in 
response to increases in plantain price although less than proportionately.  The area 
cultivated in Colombia is elastic (a = -1.124) with respect to the area cultivated in Bolivia 
and Peru.  Changes in the area cultivated in the other major producing countries, 
whether due to eradication efforts or other factors in those countries, appear to be more   11
than offset by changes in the area cultivated in Colombia.  This result is consistent with 
the argument of Youngers (2000) and others that coca eradication in the Andean 
region, while successful in reducing production in the Bolivia and Peru, has not reduced 
the total supply from the region.  
Model 2.  Because the coca bush is typically maintained over a number of years, 
we estimated an alternative model with a lagged dependent variable to examine 
whether accounting for plant-stock carryover affects our parameter estimates.  
Regression results are presented in Table 2.  The coefficient of determination, which 
was high in the previous model, is now slightly higher.   All signs remain the same and 
all parameter estimates are significant at the 10 percent level with the exception of area 
cultivated in Bolivia and Peru.  Thus, when the perennial nature of the coca plant is 
taken into account, the conclusion that eradication is ineffective remains valid. 
Dynamic multipliers, whose calculation is made possible by lagging the 
dependent variable, are presented in Table 4.  For three of the four independent 
variables, the static elasticities from model 1 lie between the short-run and long-run 
dynamic multipliers for model 2. 
Model 3.  The data on hectares of coca eradicated exhibit a sharp increase in 
1998 (see Figure 1).  We therefore estimated a model, similar to model 1, but with a 
dummy variable included to determine the extent to which this one-year spike in 
eradication affects the parameter estimates.  As show in Table 3, the estimated 
parameter of the dummy variable is statistically significant at the one percent level.  The 
parameters of the other variables are all significant and the signs remain consistent with   12
our hypotheses.  The coefficient of determination (0.997) is slightly higher than in 
models 1 and 2.  Static multipliers for model 3 are presented in Table 4. 
Autoregression Diagnostics.  Autoregression would violate the assumptions of 
the classical linear regression model, making OLS estimates inefficient.  We analyzed 
the residuals of the estimated models to detect the possible presence of serial 
correlation.  Given the error process  
t 1 - t         m re e + = t      (t = 1, 2, ,…), 
we tested the null hypothesis, H0: r = 0.  The Durbin-Watson test, which is appropriate 
when there is no lagged dependent variable, was used for models 1 and 3.  The Durbin-
h test, appropriate when there is a lagged dependent, was used for model 2.  The test 
statistics are reported in Table 1, 2, and 3.  The null hypothesis was not rejected at the 
10% level for all three models, indicating the absence of serial correlation. 
Sample-Size Diagnostics.  Given the small size of the dataset, we utilized an 
influence diagnostic test to determine the relative effects of each annual observation on 
the estimated parameters of the model (Belsley, Kuh, and Welch 1980).  The DFBETA 
statistic indicates whether the change in the j th parameter as a consequence of 
dropping the observation for the ith year is significant.  The hypothesis associated with 


















where j b ˆ is the jth estimated parameter when the whole sample is used, and 
i
j b  is the 
jth estimated parameter when the ith observation is dropped.  The estimated DFBETA 
statistic indicates that none of the parameters changes significantly (a = 5%) when each   13
observation is dropped one at a time with the exception of the parameter for eradicated 
area, which changes when the 1999 observation is dropped (see appendix).  Though 
the magnitude of the effect of eradicated area on cultivated area changes when this 
year is omitted, the parameter is still statistically significant and the sign remains 
positive.  Furthermore, it is only the 1999 observation that causes this parameter to 
change.   
In summary, hypothesis H0 is rejected for only one of the estimated betas and for 
one observation.  It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that our findings regarding 
the determinants of coca cultivation in Colombia are not unduly influenced by the size of 
the sample. 
 
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
  Our analysis indicates that the coca eradication policy of the Government of 
Colombia has not achieved its objective of reducing coca cultivation.  Rather, cultivated 
area has increased as eradication efforts have intensified.   Farmers appear to 
compensate for destruction of the crop by cultivating more extensively.   The finding that 
the price of a key alternative crop, plantain, is negatively related to coca production 
suggests that the Colombia government could achieve its narcotic-control objectives 
more effectively by focusing on policies that increase farmers’ net return coming from 
legal crops.  Such policies might include assignment of secure property rights for land, 
provision of technical assistance and credit, mechanisms to improve marketing 
conditions for agricultural products, and infrastructure investments.  Direct subsidies or 
lump sum transfers to farmers shifting from coca to other crops should be considered.    14
However, neither public nor private investments in rural areas may be feasible as long 
as the civil war in Colombia continues.  While crop substitution programs in other 
countries have not proven to be a panacea as long as adverse socioeconomic and 
political conditions persist, our analysis suggests that crop substitution is nevertheless 
more likely to be effective than eradication. 
Colombian coca cultivation is positively related to the price of coca.  Reducing 
the demand for cocaine in consuming countries may lead to a lower farm-gate price for 
coca.  Drug policy objectives of the U.S. and other cocaine-consuming countries could 
likely be achieved more effectively by focusing on demand control at home rather than 
on supply control efforts such as Plan Colombia.      15
Table 1.  Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 1988-2001.  Model With Lagged 
Independent Variables But No Lagged Dependent Variable. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t-statistic  Probability 
Intercept  142560.2***  13054.85  10.920090  0.0000 
P(-1)  11.40291**   4.772205  2.389442        0.0406 
E(-1)  0.741728***  0.120588  6.150945  0.0002 
PP(-1)  -32.56780**  12.34778  -2.637543   0.0270 
O(-1)  -0.509218***  0.067404  -7.554730  0.0000 
       
R-squared  0.991682     
Adjusted R-squared  0.987986     
F-statistic  268.2605     
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.148129     
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Dependent Variable (period t):  
H: Cultivated area in Colombia (ha) 
 
Independent Variables (period t-1): 
P: Farm-gate coca base price in Colombia (in constant 2000 US$) 
E: Eradicated area in Colombia (ha) 
PP: Farm-gate price of plantain in Colombia (in constant 2000 US$) 
O: Cultivated area in Peru and Bolivia 
 
 
Table 2.  Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 1988-2001.  Model With Lagged Dependent 
and Independent Variables. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t-statistic  Probability 
Intercept  49565.8  32562.58  1.522169  0.1665 
P(-1)  10.42816**  3.495908  2.982963  0.0175 
E(-1)  0.577060***  0.103807  5.558992  0.0005 
PP(-1)  -19.87081*  9.959068  -1.995248  0.0811 
O(-1)  -0.147690  0.130660  -1.130344  0.2911 
A(-1)  0.597419**  0.200047  2.986394  0.0174 
       
R-squared  0.996067     
Adjusted R-squared  0.993609     
F-statistic  405.2129     
Durbin-h statistic  1.933000     
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
   16
  
Table 3.  Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 1988-2001.  Model With Dummy Variable, 
Lagged Independent Variables, But No Lagged Dependent Variable. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t-statistic  Probability  
Intercept  123312.0***  10508.0241  11.7350  0.0000 
P(-1)  8.7326**  3.3304  2.6221  0.0310 
E(-1)  0.9643***  0.1047  9.2063  0.0000 
PP(-1)  -18.7477*  9.3080  -2.0141  0.0790 
O(-1)  -0.4520***  0.0487  -9.2804  0.0000 
Dummy  -16181.03***  4757.6321  -3.4011  0.0090 
       
R-squared  0.997     
Adjusted R-squared  0.994     
F-statistic  468.902     
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.192185     






Table 4.  Elasticities of Area Planted in Coca for Models 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2*  Model 3 
    Short run  Long run   
         
P  0.181  0.132  0.328  0.111 
E  0.209  0.159  0.395  0.265 
PP  -0.380  -0.210  -0.523  -0.198 
O  -1.124  -0.294  -0.729  -0.899 
* Model 2 is a lagged-dependent variable model; therefore, separate short-run and long-
run elasticities are computed.  A single elasticity is computed for each independent 
variable for models 1 and 3, which do not have a lagged dependent variable.   17
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Table A1.  DFBETA Test Statistic 
   










Peru & Bolivia 
1988  -1.0367  1.4293  0.6696  -0.1403  0.8283 
1989  -0.0197  0.0149  0.0967  -0.1230  0.1026 
1990  -0.0105  -0.1418  -0.0801  0.1692  -0.0359 
1991  0.0086  -0.4692  -0.1469  0.4138  -0.1296 
1992  -0.2341  0.2170  0.1978  0.0901  0.0481 
1993  0.0723  -0.1392  -0.0560  -0.0210  0.0171 
1994  -0.4382  0.0368  0.4366  0.1546  0.2753 
1995  -0.0168  -0.3367  0.1211  0.0230  0.0891 
1996  -0.2417  -0.1032  0.4615  -0.2636  0.5611 
1997  -0.1417  -0.2020  -0.0658  0.4797  -0.1901 
1998  -0.0499  -0.0293  0.0652  0.0438  0.0307 
1999  2.1740  0.8251  -2.7217*  -1.6503  -1.2511 
2000  0.1102  0.0257  -0.0809  -0.0243  -0.1114 
2001  0.6329  0.2161  -0.1701  -0.1260  -0.7154 
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